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THE REAL OSCAR CURSE: 
THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF POSITIVE STATUS SHIFTS 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
We examine the negative consequences of upward mobility following a sudden positive status 
shift. Building on sociological and social psychological research on status and happiness, we argue that 
status disruption and status deprivation provide different explanations of why sudden positive status shifts 
can have negative consequences for upwardly mobile social actors. We use the Oscar curse, the colorful 
belief that misfortune paradoxically befalls Academy Award winners, as our empirical context for 
studying the negative consequences of positive status shifts. We find no evidence of a professional Oscar 
curse: Male and female Oscar winners and Oscar nominees appear in more films following their Oscar 
experiences than other actors. We find most evidence of a male personal Oscar curse. Survival analysis 
shows that the divorce rates of male Oscar winners and nominees increase following the Oscars but not 
the divorce rates of female Oscar winner and nominees. Our survival analysis suggests also that status 
disruption accounts for the negative male Oscar winner effect, whereas status deprivation accounts for the 
negative male Oscar nominee effect. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for 
status theory and how our study draws attention to the negative aspects of the proliferation of tournament 
structures in organizations and other aspects of social life. 
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This study examines the negative consequences of sudden positive status shifts. The status of a 
social actor is defined by the hierarchical position the actor occupies within a social system (Gould, 2002) 
and a positive status shift is, accordingly, a move from a lower ranked position to a higher ranked position 
accorded more prestige or social esteem.1 Status is important because resources and opportunities are 
rarely distributed equally throughout social systems but accrue disproportionally to the occupants of 
higher statuses (Blau, 1994; Sørensen, 1996). We focus on the negative consequences of sudden positive 
status shifts as opposed to moving gradually from a lower to a higher status position over a longer period 
of time. Winning a Nobel Prize, Fields Medal or Academy Award, for example, implies a sudden positive 
status shift, an entry into an elite group of laureates, whereas graduating from college represents a more 
gradual transition into a new status group.2 Because resources and opportunities accrue disproportionally 
at the top of the status hierarchy, higher status is generally viewed as something desirable. It is not 
surprising therefore that most research on sudden positive status shifts focuses on the positive 
consequences of suddenly moving up the status hierarchy (Azoulay, Stuart, and Wang, 2014). Even if 
upward mobility grants access to resources and opportunities, status disruption and status deprivation 
ensure, however, that sudden positive status shifts are, paradoxically, not without problems that can limit 
the benefits of moving up the status hierarchy.    
Status disruption occurs because the social and cultural implications of occupying a particular 
status position are more far reaching than simply providing differential access to resources and 
opportunities. With each status comes a social identity that codifies the “culturally defined expectations” 
(Merton, 1957: 110) to that status that are shared within the status itself and the broader surrounding 
                                                          
1 Defining status in terms of hierarchical positions in social systems is consistent with classical 
anthropological and sociological status research (Linton, 1936; Merton, 1957) but broader than, though 
not necessarily inconsistent with, more recent status research defining status more narrowly as a signal of 
quality (Podolny, 1993) or a stock of accumulated deference (Podolny and Phillips, 1996). See Jensen, 
Kim, and Kim (2011) for a recent discussion of status definitions, and Sharkey (2014) for a recent study 
showing the value of moving beyond status as a signal of quality and adopting a broader status definition. 
2 The implication is not that hard work and strong performance do not precede winning a Nobel Prize, for 
example, only that winning the prize is not guaranteed based on predetermined absolute standards and, 
therefore, is a more discrete and sudden event than graduating from college. Nor does a Nobel Prize 
always imply that winners are dramatically higher quality than close non-winners, but winning implies a 
symbolic consecration of quality that is difficult to obtain otherwise.  
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social system (Jensen, Kim, and Kim, 2011). Status provides social actors not only access to resources 
and opportunities but also a social identity that embeds the actor socially and culturally in the social 
system. The social and cultural embedding in a status position makes upward mobility within a status 
hierarchy disruptive, which implies that even successful upward mobility can have negative consequences. 
Status homophily ensures that social interactions typically occur within a given status and not between 
different statuses, which results in segregated social networks and demarcated cultural frameworks that 
reinforces the differences between statuses (Podolny, 1994). Moving between status positions, as opposed 
to merely attaining a particular goal, is, therefore, often a disruptive experience that involves social and 
cultural dislocation or disembeddedness, which can lead to anomie through a loss of social support, 
cultural belonging, and sense of self (Durkheim, 1897; Sorokin, 1927). The disruption associated with 
social and cultural disembedding and the difficulties of reembedding into a new status position should be 
taken into account to fully assess the consequences of sudden upward mobility.  
Status deprivation occurs because the exclusivity of higher status positions ensures that most 
social actors within a social system cannot attain the highest status, even if the actual differences between 
actors in neighboring status positions are small. The exclusivity and inequity of status hierarchies have 
important negative social and psychological implications. An important social implication is the 
precarious position of social actors that aspire to become higher status by trying to “act higher status” 
without having the background and resources that come with actually being higher status (Blau, 1956). 
Having the aspiration and opportunity to ascend the status hierarchy but failing can be a particularly 
negative experience because failing to obtain a desired outcome is often associated with dissatisfaction 
and resentment (Davies, 1962; Crosby, 1976). Specifically, integrating research on relative deprivation 
and counterfactual comparisons (Heider, 1958; Olsen and Roese, 2002), we argue that barely failing to 
move up the status hierarchy can be stressful regardless of any absolute increase in status. The 
disproportional attractiveness of higher status compared to lower status and the visible inequity between 
higher and lower status increases deprivation-induced negative affect because they make it easier for the 
social actors who barely failed moving up to the next status level to imagine what it would be like to be 
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higher status and how it ‘almost’ happened’ (Roese, 1997; Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich, 1995). 
It is important to study the negative consequences of sudden positive status shifts for at least two 
reasons. First, the use of prizes and awards as status markers has increased dramatically not only in the 
arts and sciences but in organizations, markets, and society more broadly (English, 2005; Frank and Cook, 
1995). The frequent use of prizes and awards as status markers has made sudden positive status shifts a 
more prevalent phenomenon and therefore increased the importance of studying their negative 
consequences. The core feature of traditional prize and award competitions, the tournament structure 
emphasizing relative performance as opposed to absolute performance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), has 
itself become a common way of organizing competition more broadly. Indeed, Bothner, Kang, and Stuart 
(2007: 209) note pointedly that the core features of tournaments, the ranking of social actors by relative 
performance and the pairing of rewards and ranks, operate to varying extent in most status hierarchies. 
Most organizations, for example, resemble status hierarchies and hiring, compensation, and promotion are 
often decided by relative performance, not absolute performance, which amplifies the skewed distribution 
of rewards across organizational ranks (Lazear, 2004; Rosenbaum, 1979). The importance of tournaments 
and sudden status shifts extend, therefore, beyond prize and award competitions to provide important 
sources of social mobility and social inequality, two core areas of interest in organizational sociology and 
labor market research (Blau, 1977). 
Second, despite the proliferation of tournaments as status markers and compensation mechanisms, 
little is known about the negative consequences of sudden positive status shifts.3 Most research privileges 
the positive aspects of status including how higher status enables cost reductions (Podolny, 1993), market 
entry (Jensen, 2003), and higher prices (Malter, 2014). When the negative consequences of status are 
emphasized, focus is mainly on the negative aspects of occupying a high status such as status anxiety 
(Jensen, 2006), relational discrimination (Jensen, 2008), and complacency and distraction (Bothner, Kim, 
                                                          
3 Although we focus on status disruption and status deprivation, we do not argue against tournaments 
because their intended positive consequences may well exceed their unintended negative consequences. 
We intend instead to spur interest in the dark sides of tournaments and status shifts as compensation and 
promotion mechanisms by using a highly visible empirical context to draw attention to their negative 
consequences. 
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and Smith, 2012). More related to our focus on negative consequences, Kovács and Sharkey (2014) report 
that winning a book award attracts more readers but also reduces average quality evaluations because the 
new readers have more diverse tastes. By emphasizing that status embeds social actors socially and 
culturally in social systems, our study adds that it is important to be cognizant of a broader set of status 
effects. Specifically, our focus on status disruption and status deprivation extends research beyond the 
direct or indirect status effects on product quality evaluations and the simple assumption that positive 
status shifts providing access to more resources and opportunities are unproblematic. Finally, whereas 
most status research focuses on continuous status hierarchies (Podolny, 1993; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 
1999), we recognize that many status hierarchies, especially in tournaments, are of a more discontinuous 
or categorical nature (Jensen and Roy, 2008; Azoulay, Stuart, and Wang, 2014), which may amplify the 
social and psychological consequences of moving between different status levels.  
We study the negative effects of sudden positive status shifts in the context of Academy Awards 
by focusing on how the Oscars affect the personal lives and professional careers of male and female elite 
screen actors. Luise Rainer first emphasized the negative consequences of the Oscars by blaming her 
Oscars for The Great Ziegfeld (1936) and The Good Earth (1937) for the rapid decline in her career: “For 
my second and third pictures I won Academy Awards. Nothing worse could have happened to me” 
(Donaldson-Evans, 2006). Following Luise Rainer, other actors have blamed their Oscars for derailing 
otherwise promising or successful careers, fueling public interest in an Oscar curse. Richard Dreyfuss, for 
example, supposedly muttered “It’s all Oscar’s fault” as he was pulled from a near-fatal car crash that 
marked the professional and personal decline into a serious drug and alcohol addiction after his 1978 
Oscar for The Goodbye Girl (Donaldson-Evans, 2006). The Oscar curse is not only an intriguing piece of 
Hollywood folklore that continues to capture the public imagination, it provides also a vivid example of 
the paradox that positive events can have negative consequences. More importantly, the long history of 
the Oscars and the publicity surrounding elite screen actors offer a unique opportunity to trace the 
complete life histories of a large sample of elite screen actors (and their spouses and parents) and 
therefore provide a rare systematic insight into some of the long-term negative consequences of sudden 
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positive status shifts.   
 
THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF POSITIVE STATUS SHIFTS 
We build next on sociological and social psychological research on status and happiness to 
describe the theoretical mechanisms, status disruption and status deprivation, through which positive 
status shifts can lead to negative outcomes for social actors. 
  
Status Disruption 
Status positions embed social actors in cultural frameworks, that is, social norms and cognitive 
repertoires, and social relations, thus suggesting that sudden movements between status positions can be 
culturally and socially disruptive. First, status positions delineate social norms, cognitive repertoires, and 
role expectations (Jensen, Kim, and Kim, 2011; Jensen, Kim, and Kim,2012). To act in a status-consistent 
manner, it is necessary to understand the “minimum of attitudes and behavior” (Linton, 1936: 114) and 
“culturally defined expectations” (Merton, 1957: 110) that defines a status position. Swidler (1986) added 
that cultural embedding shapes action not by providing ultimate values towards which action is directed 
but by providing repertoires of habits, skills, and styles from which strategies of action are constructed. 
Second, status positions delineate the social relations accessible to social actors. Status homophily, 
defined as the tendency of social actors to form relations with other social actors of similar status, ensures 
that more social relations occur within a status position than between status positions (Gould, 2002). 
Podolny (1994) showed, for example, that higher status social actors are less likely to form and maintain 
social relations with lower status actors than with other higher status actors because social relations with 
lower status actors could diminish their own status position. The delineation of cultural frameworks and 
social relations within status positions are mutually reinforcing processes: Social relations are more likely 
when shared cultural frameworks exist and shared cultural frameworks are more likely when social 
relations exist. 
The embedding of social actors in status positions makes it harder to benefit from moving up the 
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status hierarchy because the cultural frameworks and social support system necessary to act successfully 
in their new status differ from their old status. The cultural and social disruptions that follow a sudden 
positive status shift may indeed counterweigh and sometimes even outweigh gains in resources and 
opportunities. Sociologists have long studied the negative consequences of positive status shifts. 
Durkheim (1897) first argued that economic progress is not only a positive event but is often associated 
with higher suicide rates because it disrupts social relations and create insatiable demands for more 
regardless of current status position. Sorokin (1927: 523) noted similarly that social actors moving to a 
higher status position risk being “lonely as a socially unattached atom” because behavioral uniformity 
within status positions makes it difficult to form new close relations. And Blau (1956: 290) emphasized 
cultural and social disruption by describing upwardly mobile social actors as “marginal men, in some 
respects out of tune with others both in their new and original strata in the occupational hierarchy.” The 
cultural and social disruptions that follow positive status shifts may, in other words, result in anomie or 
social disintegration as expressed in a restless “thirst for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless 
sensations, all of which lose their savor once known” (Durkheim, 1897: 256).     
In addition to the cultural and social disruptions that follow positive status shifts, suddenly 
gaining access to more resources and opportunities can itself lead to a decrease in happiness (Schwartz, 
2004). The increase in choices that follows having access to more resources and opportunities appear 
initially appealing but managing choices is difficult and more choices can therefore be demotivating and 
result in less satisfaction with the final choice (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Chua and Iyengar, 2006). Even 
if choice overload does not have negative consequences (see Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd, 2010), 
it may not increase long-term happiness either. Brickman and Campbell (1971) argued that people react 
briefly to good (bad) events by experiencing increased happiness (unhappiness) but adapt quickly to the 
new circumstances and return to pre-event levels of happiness. Gaining access to more resources and 
opportunities is, therefore, not a guarantee of a permanent increase in happiness, as evidenced by lottery 
winners reverting to their pre-lottery level of happiness shortly after their win (Brickman, Coates, and 
Janoff-Bulman, 1978). When people seek more happiness through experiences and objects widely 
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assumed to increase happiness, they will likely end up disappointed because adaptation ensures that the 
new situation eventually ceases to elicit a positive reaction, thus suggesting that positive status shifts may 
mainly amount to another turn in the ‘hedonic treadmill’ (Brickman and Campbell, 1971, see also Diener, 
Lucas, and Scollon, 2006).  
 
Status Deprivation 
Regardless of the cultural and social disruptions that follow sudden positive status shifts, the 
inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities in status hierarchies can itself have negative 
consequences. The inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities refers to the greater availability 
of resources and opportunities at higher status positions than suggested by the quality differences between 
occupants of different status positions. Rosen (1981: 846) examined an extreme form of status hierarchy, 
that of superstars, in which “small differences in talent become magnified in larger earnings differences” 
because of imperfect substitution – several mediocre screen actors, for example, do not add up to a single 
superstar. Gould (2002) argued slightly differently that status hierarchies emerge because individuals vary 
in their underlying qualities and that social interactions magnify these differences because social actors of 
above-average status are overvalued whereas those of below-average status are undervalued. 
Notwithstanding the mechanisms creating and sustaining status hierarchies, Rosen (1981) and Gould 
(2002) agree about an important implication of status inequity: Small absolute differences between social 
actors on each side of a status boundary are amplified and result in large relative differences in available 
resources and opportunities.  
The inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities in status hierarchies can have negative 
consequences for upwardly mobile social actors because relative deprivation and counterfactual 
comparisons make it particularly frustrating to barely fail to move to a higher status position. Relative 
deprivation refers to the dissatisfaction experienced by people who “feel unjustly treated or inadequately 
compensated when they compare themselves to some standard of reference” (Crosby, 1976: 85). Rather 
than focusing on absolute outcomes, people focus on relative outcomes, evaluate their outcomes in 
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relation to standards, and feel deprived if their outcomes are below the standard. Relative deprivation is 
more likely when people desire particular outcomes, when other similar people have the desired outcomes, 
and when they feel they deserve the desired outcomes (Davis, 1959; Runciman, 1966; Crosby, 1976). 
Most relative deprivation research focuses on social or temporal comparison standards, defined by the 
outcomes of other people and own outcomes in the past, but more recent research suggests that only 
counterfactual comparisons, defined by the outcomes that one could have obtained but did not, are 
necessary (Olson and Roese, 2002: 268). Specifically, social and temporal comparisons affect 
dissatisfaction through counterfactual comparisons: Seeing other people possessing a desired object or 
having possessed the object in the past simply makes it easier for people to imagine possessing the object 
themselves. 
Moving up the status hierarchy is generally viewed as a desired outcome. When people almost 
obtain a desired outcome, they sometimes become preoccupied with what almost happened and therefore 
particularly frustrated by its denial: “A near success leads to exasperation, heightened frustration, the 
feeling of being teased, of being unfortunate” (Heider, 1958: 141). The negative affect that follows barely 
failing provides fertile grounds for counterfactual thinking about how actual outcomes compare to 
imaginary outcomes that “might have been” (Kahneman, 1995; Roese, 1997). When outcomes are 
difficult to control, counterfactual thinking amplifies and prolongs negative affect because ruminations 
about how things could have turned out better makes the comparatively deprived current state more 
salient (Roese, 1994). Relative deprivation through counterfactual thinking can therefore lead social 
actors in higher status positions that barely missed an even higher position to be more frustrated and less 
happy with their situation than social actors in lower positions even if they have not experience an actual 
status loss. In a study of the Olympics, for example, Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995) showed that 
bronze medalists on average appeared happier receiving their medals than silver medalists. They 
explained the paradox by arguing that bronze medalists generated downward counterfactuals: “I might 
have not won a medal, but I did.” Silver medalists, on the other hand, generated upward counterfactuals 
that made them feel deprived: “I almost won the gold medal, but I did not.” 
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Status Disruption versus Status Deprivation 
 Status disruption and status deprivation are both important aspects of status hierarchies but they 
nevertheless provide different explanations why positive status shifts have negative consequences. 
According to the status disruption arguments, the more social and cultural disruptions that positive status 
shifts entail, the more negative consequences ensues. Assuming equal distance between low, medium, 
and high status, moving from low to high status is therefore more disruptive than moving from low to 
medium or medium to high status and moving from low to medium status is more disruptive than not 
moving at all. According to the status deprivation arguments, it is less the amount of status disruption and 
more the failure to reach a desired status that matters. Specifically, barely failing to move to a higher 
status position when given the opportunity can have negative consequences because of counterfactual 
comparison: Moving from low to medium status but failing to move to high status is therefore more 
upsetting than moving from low to high status or not moving at all. We explore these arguments in the 
context of Academy Awards by examining the negative personal consequences for screen actors winning 
an Oscar (high status) or being nominated but failing to win an Oscar (medium status) as compared to not 
being nominated (low status). 
 
THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF ACADEMY AWARDS 
 The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences granted the first Oscars in 1929, creating what 
is today the oldest, most visible, and most prestigious awards in the film industry. The Academy Awards 
(now officially The Oscars) has changed little since 1929: The nominees and winners are still decided by 
the members of the Academy, the nominees are revealed a month or two before the awards ceremony, and 
the winners are announced at the ceremony (which has been a major television event since the 1950s). 
The Oscar is the most important mechanism to ascend the screen acting hierarchy and to symbolically 
consecrate having already risen to the top (Rossman, Esparza, and Bonacich, 2010). The Oscar provides 
entry into a very elite group of the most successful and distinguished screen actors and important personal 
reassurance for actors that they actually are considered worthy members of the elite. As noted by Levy 
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(2001: 44): “What makes the Oscar such an influential award is its peculiar combination of the three 
evaluations – and audiences. Through the Oscar, the Academy functions as peers, critics, and tastemakers. 
No other award so well combines critical and popular judgment.” Even if John Wayne had no reason to 
doubt his position in the screen acting elite and used to deride awards, he tellingly recanted when he 
finally won an Oscar for True Grit in 1969: “The Oscar is a beautiful thing to have. It symbolizes 
appreciation of yourself by your peers. The Oscar means a lot to me, even if it took the industry 40 years 
to get around to it” (Levy, 2001: 245). 
 
Status Deprivation, Status Disruption, and Divorce 
Although the Oscar curse referred originally to the belief that the Oscars ruin professional careers, 
we focus mainly on the belief that the Oscars have negative marital consequences, as widely conjectured 
when Helen Hunt, Reese Witherspoon, and Sandra Bullock divorced shortly after their Oscars (O’Neil, 
2010). Status disruption and status deprivation plausibly account for the increases in divorce following 
the Oscars through professional stress and dissatisfaction, both of which affect marital satisfaction and 
conflict and, therefore, divorce (Marshall, Chadwick, and Marshall, 1992).    
For actors winning an Oscar, status disruption from moving to a higher status with more 
opportunities but also higher expectations to acting quality can manifest itself in professional stress. As 
expressed by Humphrey Bogart: “You’ve seen what happens to some Oscar winners. They spent the rest 
of their lives turning down manuscripts while searching for the great role to win another one. Hell, I hope 
I’m never even nominated again” (Levy, 2001: 295).4 Winning an Oscar can be stressful also because the 
sudden abundance of opportunities can strain the ability of actors to decide what opportunities to accept. 
As experienced by Gwyneth Paltrow after her first Oscar for Shakespeare in Love: “I became insouciant 
about the things that I chose. I thought ‘Oh, I’ll try this, it’ll be fun or I’ll do that for the money’” 
                                                          
4 Merton (1968: 57) noted a similar increase in professional stress in Nobel laureate scientists: “More and 
more is expected of them, and this creates its own measure of motivation and stress.” And Kets de Vries 
(2005: 112) observed that some managers in senior executive positions feel like “fakes” unworthy of their 
promotions and therefore “set excessively high, unrealistic goals” that create even more stress. 
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(Donaldson-Evans, 2006). In addition to professional stress, winning an Oscars can damage relationships 
with peers, friends, and family. Winning an Oscars risk damaging existing social relationships simply 
because increased professional expectations and popular attention force actors to devote even more time 
on their careers, which can make it hard to deal with conflicting feelings of superiority/inferiority, 
pride/jealousy, and importance/neglect that often emerge within a relationship. As Oscar winner Joan 
Fontaine commented: “A picture taken after the Oscar banquet of Brian (Aherne) sitting alone in an 
empty room, feet up on a chair, my fur coat over his arm, awaiting patiently for the photographers to 
finish with the winners, graphically illustrates the plight of marriage when the wife is more successful that 
the husband” (Levy, 2001: 294-295).   
In sum, according to the status disruption arguments, the negative personal consequences of the 
Oscars are stronger, the more status disruption caused by the Oscars. Winning an Oscar, in particular in 
the first nomination, represents a dramatic status shift for screen actors. Based on the status disruption 
argument, we hypothesize therefore that winners are more likely to experience negative personal 
consequences in the form of divorce following the Oscars than actors not nominated for an Oscar.  
Hypothesis 1: Compared to not being nominated for an Oscar, winning an Oscar increases the 
likelihood of divorce. 
The non-winning Oscar nominees may, however, be susceptible to stress-inducing status 
deprivation because of counterfactual comparisons. Although an Oscar nomination is a great 
accomplishment and a positive status shift in itself, it can also be a constant reminder of a painful failure 
to win, a salient form of status deprivation. Despite the poise and grace that losing Oscar nominees show 
when the winner is announced, the disappointment from having lost what could be the chance of a 
lifetime is painful. As expressed by Dustin Hoffman, the Oscars “put very talented and good people 
against each other and they hurt the hell out of the ones that lose” (Levy, 2001: 247). It is uncertain 
whether and when the nominees will come across another equally great role that could help give them 
another chance at winning the most prestigious award in the film industry. And as in other situations in 
which it is easy to imagine alternative outcomes but the outcomes themselves are uncontrollable (Roese, 
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1997), being nominated but not winning is the type of situation for generating upward counterfactuals that 
lead to more disappointment and negative affect. To the extent that nominees think of themselves as being 
similar to winners but eventually realize the real difference between being ‘only’ a nominee and a real 
winner, the discrepancy between the actual-self and the ideal-self likely increases feelings of depression 
and anxiety (Higgins, Klein, and Strauman, 1985), feelings that are likely stronger shortly after the Oscars. 
A failed Oscar nomination could, in other words, be a poignant source of professional stress and 
dissatisfaction that can lead to marital conflict and dissatisfaction and therefore divorce (Marshall, 
Chadwick, and Marshall, 1992) even if it simultaneously represents a coveted acknowledgement of acting 
quality.  
In sum, according to the status deprivation arguments, the negative personal effects of Oscars are 
stronger, the more the Oscars make screen actors feel relatively deprived through counterfactual 
comparisons. Based on the status deprivation argument, we hypothesize therefore that screen actors 
nominated for an Oscar but failing to win the Oscar are more likely to experience negative personal 
consequences in the form of divorce following the Oscars than actors winning an Oscar and actors not 
nominated for an Oscar.5 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to (A) not being nominated for an Oscar and (B) winning an Oscar, 
being nominated but not winning the Oscar increases the likelihood of divorce. 
It is important to note that the status disruption and status deprivation arguments provide different 
but not mutually exclusive explanations for why the Oscars could have negative consequences for Oscar 
winners and nominees. Simply comparing the relative likelihoods of divorce between Oscar winners and 
nominees cannot necessarily adjudicate between status disruption and status deprivation because winners 
could experience negative consequences due to status disruption while nominees could simultaneously 
experience negative consequences due to status deprivation or status disruption. Our empirical approach 
                                                          
5 Some elite actors may be disappointed if they do not receive an Oscar nomination. We do not predict, 
however, that this will lead to significant personal consequences: Not being nominated does not attract 
much external attention and is therefore not as salient an event as failing to win after being nominated and 
the probability of being nominated is much harder to assess and generally lower than the probability of 
winning among the five nominees. 
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is therefore to first test our hypotheses for evidence of an Oscar curse and then provide additional 
evidence that the mechanisms accounting for the hypothesized winner and nominee effects are status 
disruption and status deprivation respectively. 
 
Gender Differences in Status Disruption and Status Deprivation 
In developing our main status disruption and status deprivation arguments, we have implicitly 
assumed that all actors react similarly to status disruption and status deprivation. The impact of status 
disruption and status deprivation may differ, however, depending on how certain groups respond to 
upward status shifts. Research on differences in how males and females react to stress, missed 
opportunities, and disappointments discussed below shows that male actors may be more susceptible to 
status disruption and status deprivation. We argue accordingly that Oscar induced status disruption and 
status deprivation may increase the likelihood that male actors experience divorce but not necessarily the 
likelihood that female actors experience divorce.  
First, ascending the status hierarchy by winning an Oscar can be disruptive because it provides 
access to more attractive resources and opportunities including attractive spousal alternatives, an 
important determinant of divorce (South, Trent, and Shen, 2001). As noted by a Hollywood marriage 
counselor, professional success and domestic disruption are connected: “When you win an award like that, 
you get more offers than you could possibly deal with. It’s hard not to get caught up in it and to keep 
yourself grounded in a relationship” (Mackenzie, 2002). Although both male and female actors are likely 
to get more attractive spousal alternatives following the Oscars, male actors tend to respond differently to 
the new opportunities in a way that disrupts their personal lives. Roese et al. (2006: 779) report that males, 
more than females, emphasize regrets of inaction over action within romantic relationships and that the 
difference is substantively larger for sexual activity: “Men are vastly more likely than women to regret 
not trying harder to have sex or to regret missing an opportunity for sex.” Indeed, research on sexual 
infidelity among married couples shows that males tend to engage in more extramarital sex than females 
(Munsch, 2012; Treas and Giesen, 2000) and sexual infidelity is among the most common and strongest 
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determinants of divorce (DeMaris, 2013; Amato, 2010; Petersen and Hyde, 2010). The causal linkage 
between Oscar induced status disruption and divorce may, in other words, be particularly strong for male 
actors.   
Second, failing to ascend the status hierarchy by not winning an Oscar nomination can trigger 
counterfactual comparisons that make actors feel relatively deprived. Male actors are not only more likely 
to feel relatively deprived, however, they may also respond differently to feeling relatively deprived than 
female actors. Males tend to be more stressed by work and financial events, whereas females tend to be 
more affected by exposure to family-related events (Conger et al., 1993; Matud, 2004). Moreover, the 
mental health of males but not females tends to be positively affected by earnings increases and social 
status (Kessler and McRae, 1982; Klose and Jacobi, 2004). Males are generally more likely than females 
to respond to disappointments by acting physically and verbally aggressive (Archer, 2004) and they are 
more likely to lose control after being exposed to a negative emotional cue (Card and Dahl, 2012). Card 
and Dahl (2012) report, for example, that male-to-female violence increases following an unexpected loss 
by the local professional football team but not female-to-male violence. Not surprisingly, domestic 
violence and frequent conflicts are, together with infidelity, the most important reasons for divorce 
(Amato, 2010).  Male actors may, in other words, simply be worse at handling disappointments such as 
failing to win an Oscar nomination (even if failing to win does not result in domestic violence) and they 
are therefore particularly likely to experience divorce following professional and personal 
disappointments.  
In sum, because male and females likely react differently to status disruption and status 
deprivation, we hypothesize that the Oscars increase the divorce rate of male actors but not necessarily 
the divorce rate of female actors. 
Hypothesis 3: Compared to not being nominated for an Oscar, (A) winning an Oscar and (B) 
being nominated but not winning an Oscar increases the likelihood of divorce for male actors but 
not for female actors. 
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METHODS 
Screen Actor Sample 
 The screen acting profession is extremely stratified and porous. Most self-identified actors never 
participate in a credited role in a feature film and most actors that have appeared in a credited role never 
participate in another feature film. The stratified and porous nature of the screen acting profession makes 
random sampling problematic. First, the lack of formal entry requirements makes it impossible to 
unambiguously define the population of screen actors. Anybody can self-identify as an actor and even if 
we limit the population to include only actors with at least one credited film role, the result is still a very 
high number of actors, most of which would hardly be considered real screen actors (according to 
imdb.com, for example almost 9,000 credited actors appeared in the 290 films produced in the U.S. in 
2000 with known box offices). Second, given the relatively low number of Oscar nominees and winners, 
a random sample of a manageable size of the entire population of credited screen actors from 1930 to 
2005 would most likely not contain any nominees and winners not to mention enough for statistical 
analysis. Third, given that most screen actors in a random sample basically would be unknown bit players, 
it is impossible to collect the relatively detailed demographic data discussed below and there would be no 
cross-sectional and longitudinal variance in their acting experiences (most would have only one acting 
credit). We focus instead on the top of the screen acting hierarchy where actors’ careers are comparable 
and use elite actors sampled from two different types of films to test our arguments.6  
We sampled all the actors that played the lead male and female roles in 1,023 top commercial and 
top artistic films from 1930 to 2005. For top commercial films, we identified the box office top ten films 
from 1930 to 2005, using Worldwide Box Office, Box Office Report, and Box Office Mojo (the box 
office rankings for the 1930s and 1940s are less comprehensive than later years). For top artistic films, we 
identified an equal number of films that were nominated for Academy Awards for Best Picture or Best 
                                                          
6 By using a sample of elite actors, we risk, like Azoulay, Stuart, and Wang (2014), to underestimate the 
Oscar effects, in particular the status disruption effects, because the magnitude of Oscar-induced status 
shifts are likely less for elite actors. Our Oscar-effect estimates are therefore best viewed as conservative 
estimates.   
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Director. To sample the actors that played the lead male and female roles in the 1,023 top films, we 
focused on the first credited male and female actor in each top film (cast members were listed in order of 
appearance in a very few films in which case we simply sampled the actors in the dominant roles). Based 
on this approach, we identified 811 elite screen actors, which, after accounting for missing data, resulted 
in a sample of 808 actors comprised of 165 Oscar winners, 227 non-winning Oscar nominees, and 416 
non-nominees. Our distinction between higher status and lower status screen actors is therefore relative to 
the Academy Awards: The lower status actors in our sample are obviously not lower status in the overall 
population of actors but actors that at the minimum appear in a lead role in a top commercial or artistic 
film at least once during their career.7 For each of the actors in our sample, we use IMDB and Wikipedia 
as our main source for collecting information on their careers and personal lives but do a more extensive 
search using other electronic sources and actor biographies whenever information is missing or 
inconsistent. 
We analyze male and female elite actors separately because the labor markets and Oscar success 
criteria for male and female screen actors are different. Female actors tend to start their acting careers 
earlier and receive their first Oscar nomination at a younger age than male actors (Gilberg and Hines, 
2000). Female actors appear in fewer films than male actors throughout their career, however, because 
fewer roles exist for females, in particular older females (Levy, 1989; Bazzani et al., 1997; Lincoln and 
Allen, 2004). Moreover, because the Oscars distinguish between male and female Oscar nominees and 
winners, different informal Oscar success criteria for male and female actors have emerged over time 
including age, physical attractiveness, and film role (the most common role for female actors winning an 
Oscar are wife, mother, sister, daughter, and girlfriend, whereas it is historical figure for male actors) 
                                                          
7 An alternative approach is to sample all the Oscar nominees and winners from 1930 to 2005 and 
combine the Oscar sample with our elite sample. The disadvantage of the Oscar approach is that the 
estimated Oscar effects could be biased if the Oscar nominees (treatment group) are systematically 
different from the non-nominees (control group). To reduce bias in the treatment effects it is necessary to 
include a propensity score in the estimation of the treatment effects (D’Agostino, 1998; Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). A propensity score is the conditional probability of assignment to the treatment condition 
(Oscar nomination) given a vector of covariates that are thought to be related to both the treatment and the 
outcome (divorce) (Berk and Newton, 1985). The results are similar across the two sampling approaches.    
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(Gilberg and Hines, 2000; Hollinger, 2006; Diehm, 2014). The different Oscar success criteria for male 
and female actors have led to suggestions that all Oscar award categories should be segregated (Flanigan, 
2013) or, in contrast, that equal treatment can only be ensured by desegregating segregated Oscar 
categories (Elsesser, 2010). In sum, to avoid that unobserved gender differences in Oscar success criteria 
affect our results, we distinguish between male and female actors in our empirical analyses (we present 
full sample models before distinguishing between male and female actors). 
 
Dependent Variables 
We define the personal curse in terms of marital divorce. Divorce is a repeated event for many 
actors: Zsa Zsa Gabor tops the list with eight divorces; Mickey Rooney and Lana Turner are second with 
seven each. The 333 (372) married male (female) actors in our sample experienced a total of 420 (523) 
divorces from 1930 to 2005. We include all divorces and use repeated event history analysis to model the 
complicated marriage and divorce history of each actor.8 Humphrey Bogart, for example, as shown in 
Figure 1, is coded as married from 1926-27 (first marriage), 1928-37 (second marriage), 1938-44 (third 
marriage), and 1945-57 (fourth marriage). The outcome of a divorce is obviously not always negative. An 
Oscar nomination or win could empower an actor to divorce an abusive spouse, for example, which 
implies that divorce could be a positive, not negative, outcome. Nevertheless, most divorces among this 
elite group of actors are not empowering events but at the minimum unintended events that are socially 
and emotionally distractive for the actors involved. Indeed, the downsides of divorce are well established. 
Divorcees generally experience more stress than married individuals (Johnson and Wu, 2002) and 
marriage is associated with more happiness (Stack and Eshleman, 1998) and less long-term illness 
(Murphy, Glaser, and Grundy, 1997).  
 
 
                                                          
8 A few heterosexual actors had long-term relationships with children without marrying and a few 
homosexual actors had long-term relationships without being able to marry. We included both whenever 
possible. 
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Independent Variables 
The main independent variables are the Oscar nominee and Oscar winner status of a screen actor. 
We use time-varying Oscar variables to assess the effects of the Oscars on future film appearances and to 
avoid time-dependent or survivor bias in our divorce analyses (Sylvestre, Huszti, and Hanley, 2006; 
Beyersmann et al., 2008).9 Although we track the acting career of all actors accordingly from birth until 
death (or 2005), a given actor enters the risk set only once he or she is married. We use two binary 
variables to indicate when an actor moved into the nominee status by being nominated for an Oscar and 
when an actor moved into the winner status by winning an Oscar. Humphrey Bogart, for example, entered 
the Oscar nominee group in 1944 for his role in Casablanca and then moved to the Oscar winner group in 
1952 for his appearance in African Queen (See Figure 1). Because we treat the Oscar nominee and winner 
groups as mutually exclusive, the estimated Oscar winner coefficient represents the joint effect of being 
an Oscar nominee and a winner (because Oscar winners are also Oscar nominees), whereas the 
incremental effect of winning is the difference between the Oscar winner and nominee coefficients. In the 
case of Humphrey Bogart, the Oscar Nominee variable is coded as one from 1944 to 1951 (zero 
otherwise), whereas the Oscar Winner variable is coded as one from 1952 to 1957 (zero otherwise). We 
do not distinguish between winning or being nominated in a lead role or a supporting role because the 
criteria used to determine lead and supporting roles are unclear (Levy, 2001: 58) and unreported 
robustness checks show similar patterns for lead and supporting Oscars. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 around here. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Control Variables 
We use different control variables to rule out alternative explanations for the Oscar effects. We 
control for age decade using binary variables (binary decade variables avoid competing ‘clocks’ in our 
                                                          
9 Redelmeier and Singh (2001) reported that Oscar winners live longer than Oscar nominees (a positive 
consequences of the Oscars) but a subsequent reanalysis of their data correcting for survivor bias found 
no positive effect of Oscar wins on longevity (Sylvestre, Huszti, and Hanley, 2006). Our data confirms 
the reanalysis.   
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cox models) and a comprehensive set of variables to capture different aspects of actors’ screen acting 
experiences (not all control variables are included in the divorce models because they are either not 
relevant or are impossible to estimate because, for example, few actors divorce at high ages). We control 
for screen acting tenure (years since first movie) using binary variables for short tenure (less than or equal 
to five years), long tenure (more than 25 years but less than 50), and very long tenure (more than 50 
years). We control for the number of film appearances (linear and squared) in the five years before the 
focal year to account for (curvilinear) effects of current film appearances on future film appearances as 
well as the number of appearances in high quality films in the focal year (no curvilinear effects).10 A film 
is counted as a quality film if it was nominated (or won) one of the following Best Film (including 
Foreign Film and other subcategories) or Best Director awards: Academy Awards, National Board of 
Review of Motion Picture, Golden Globes, New York Film Critic Circle, Los Angeles Film Critics 
Association or if it opened in main competition at Cannes Film Festival, Venice Film Festival, or Berlin 
Film Festival. We mix binary and continuous variables to avoid the high collinearity between age, tenure, 
and film experiences, a problem that tended to render the age variables difficult to interpret (the main 
independent variables are robust to these alternative specifications). 
We control for early child acting experiences before the age of twelve and for early exposure to 
the acting profession through screen actor parents. Having early acting exposure may affect both the 
likelihood of divorce, and the extent to which actors have easier access to acting opportunities and 
potentially receive an Oscar. We control also for whether an actor’s spouse is an Oscar nominee or winner 
(too few Oscar spouses to separate nominees and winners) because spouses of Oscar nominees and 
winners may benefit from the visibility of their spouses. We control for actor specialization in action and 
comedy because more films are produced in these popular genres (we controlled for drama specialization 
in unreported analyses but found less specialization in drama and robust results). Action specialization 
includes action, adventure, crime, fantasy, sci-fi, and war, whereas comedy specialization includes 
                                                          
10 We use last five years film appearances because recent film appearances are more likely to affect future 
film appearances than older film appearances and it result in significantly higher model fit compared to 
cumulative film appearances.  
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comedy, musical, and romance. For each film, we collected the genre assignments published on 
imdb.com, and for each actor, we summed up the total number of genre assignments of a certain genre, 
such as action, and divided it by the total number of genre assignments up to the focal year. We calculated 
the specialization index for all genres but focus on action and comedy in our analyses because these two 
genres have continuously been dominant in the film industry and, relative to other genres, action and 
comedy actors tend to experience more typecasting (Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, and von Rittmann, 2003). 
Finally, we control for film era by distinguishing between the Studio System (1930-1949), Post War 
(1950-1965), New Hollywood (1966-1979), and Blockbuster (1980-) eras using the Blockbuster era as 
comparison (Thompson and Bordwell, 2003).  
Summary statistics and bivariate correlations for male and female screen actors are in Table 1.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 around here. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Statistical Approach 
We used a repeated-events Cox proportional hazards with robust actor-level standard errors 
approach to estimate the divorce rates of actors (Cox, 1972; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). To 
accommodate our time-varying covariates, we split the divorce history of all actors into (calendar) year 
spells and used years in marriage as the clock. The effects of the Oscars on divorce could depend on time 
in two different ways. First, the Oscar effect could be stronger immediately after the Oscar event and then 
decrease over time. To account for this possibility, we depreciated the Oscar variables linearly (and non-
linearly) over five and ten years but found no support for linear (or non-linear) Oscar depreciation effects. 
Second, the strength of the Oscar effects could depend on the duration of the marriage itself. To account 
for this alternative possibility, we interacted the Oscar winner and nominee variables with time (years) in 
marriage. Specifically, we interacted the Oscar variables with exp(-xt) where x is a depreciation constant 
and t is time in marriage using the tvc option in Stata. Using a depreciation constant of 0.25, for example, 
the Oscar effect in a two-year-old marriage would be depreciated with a factor of 0.61 (exp(-0.25 x 2)), 
whereas the effect would be depreciated with a factor of 0.37 (exp(-0.25 x 4) in a four-year-old 
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marriage.11 Since no theoretical reason exists to favor a priori a particular depreciation constant, we 
performed sensitivity analyses using depreciation constants ranging from 0.00 to 0.50 to identify the Cox 
models with the highest overall model fit.  
We used two approaches to handle repeated divorces. First, we used a ‘conditional gap time 
approach’ to account for repeated divorces according to which the estimated robust standard errors are 
clustered on actor, each strata (marriage) has its own baseline hazard rate of ending in divorce, and each 
observation (actor) is not at risk for a later event (divorce number three) before all earlier events (divorce 
number one and two) have occurred (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Second, rather than stratifying 
the data using marriage number, we also used a continuous variable to control for marriage number, 
which has the advantage of controlling for occurrence dependence (we could not control for both 
marriage and divorce number because divorce number equals marriage number minus one) (Heckman and 
Borjas, 1980). The results are robust regardless of approach, thus suggesting that we report the results 
using the more informative second approach. Finally, Cox proportional hazard regression avoids 
restricting the shape of the hazard, which is appropriate because our focus is the effects of the Oscars on 
the baseline divorce rate rather than estimating the baseline divorce rate itself (Cleves et al., 2008). We 
nevertheless re-estimated our models using parametric regressions and found the results comparable to 
the Cox results. Of the alternative parametric models (exponential, weibull, gompertz, lognormal, 
loglogistic, and gamma), the lognormal and gamma models provided the best fit, whereas the exponential 
and gompertz models provided the worst fit (these results are available from the authors).  
 
RESULTS 
Our main focus is the personal Oscar curse but we begin our statistical analyses by establishing 
that actors nominated for an Oscar or winning an Oscar on average appear in more films following their 
                                                          
11 The Oscar Winner hazard ratio (βOW), for example, should therefore be interpreted as the proportional 
change in hazard when the marriage-time adjusted Oscar effect (βOW*exp(-xt)) increases by one. In 
reporting our results, we refer to a newly married couple for simplicity because exp(-x0) = 1 in the first 
year of marriage.  
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Oscars than other actors to eliminate career decline as a general explanation for the personal Oscar curse. 
The random- and fixed-effects negative binomial regressions in Model 1 (Random) and Model 2 (Fixed) 
in Table 2 show that male actors appear in more films than female actors and that the positive Oscar 
winner and nominee effects are stronger for male actors.12 Splitting the sample by gender in Model 3 and 
Model 5 (random effects) shows that male (0.14; p < 0.001) and female (0.09; p < 0.001) Oscar nominees 
and male (0.25; p < 0.001) and female (0.36; p < 0.001) Oscar winners appear in more films in the five 
years after their Oscars than other male and female actors. Model 3 and Model 5 show also that male 
(0.25 > 0.14; ∆χ2 = 15.24; p < .001) and female (0.36 > 0.09; ∆χ2 = 73.13; p < .001) Oscar winners 
appear in more films than male and female Oscar nominees. Comparing the full models with the split 
sample models, we find that analyzing male and female actors together masks important differences 
including opposite effects of action specialization and divorce, thus confirming the appropriateness of 
using split samples.      
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 around here. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 provides additional evidence of the positive professional consequences of the Oscars. 
Male and female Oscar winners and nominees experience less of a decline in average yearly film 
appearances throughout their remaining career. Our study thus confirms the positive professional 
consequences of sudden positive status shifts observed in research on status-conferring prizes in the 
sciences (Azoulay, Stuart, and Wang, 2014).   
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 around here. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We move next from examining the consequences of the Oscars for the professional lives of actors 
to examining the consequences for their personal lives. Table 3 presents the results (in the form of hazard 
                                                          
12 We use negative binomial regression due to over-dispersion and random-effects because some 
independent variables are time-invariant and the dependent variable is time-invariant for some actors 
(Long, 1997). The results are robust to using a Poisson approach. We also re-estimated the models using 
high-quality films (defined when discussing our control variables) as the dependent variable and found 
similar, although weaker, results. 
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ratios) of Cox proportional hazard regression analysis of actor divorce rates. Starting with the full sample 
of male and female actors, Model 7 and Model 8 show that male actors on average are twenty percent less 
likely to divorce than female actors. The divorce rate of Oscar nominees and Oscar winners in Model 8 
are, however, not significantly different from non-nominees, thus showing that neither Hypothesis 1 nor 
Hypothesis 2A and 2B are supported in the full sample including both male and female actors.  
To examine why Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are not supported in the full sample, we split the 
sample by gender and examine the impact of the Oscars on the divorce rate of male and female actors 
separately. Model 10 and Model 12 suggest that the Oscars affect the divorce rate of male and female 
actors differently, explaining the insignificant Oscar effects in Model 8. The divorce rates of male Oscar 
nominees and male Oscar winners are 96 percent (1.96; p < 0.05) and 205 percent (3.05; p < 0.01) higher 
than the divorce rate of male non-nominees in the first year of marriage. The divorce rates of female 
Oscar nominees and female Oscar winners are, in contrast, 68 percent (0.32; p < 0.10) and 85 percent 
(0.15; p < 0.01) lower than the divorce rate of female non-nominees in the first year of marriage. The 
increased divorce rates of male Oscar nominees and male Oscar winners and decreased divorce rates of 
female Oscar nominees and female Oscar winners provide support for Hypothesis 3A and Hypothesis 3B: 
Compared to non-nominated male and female actors, male Oscar winners and nominees are more likely to 
divorce, whereas female actors are less likely to divorce. Finally, male and female actors respond 
differently to Oscar events depending on how many years they have been married. Specifically, the 
optimal depreciation constants in Model 10 and Model 12 are 0.15 for male actors and 0.40 for female 
actors, which suggests that the Oscars affect females for a shorter period of time than they affect male 
actors.13 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 around here. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 also shows that although the Oscar winner effect appears to be stronger than the Oscar 
                                                          
13 The effects of the Oscars only depreciate with a factor of 0.47 (exp(-0.15 x 5) after five years of marriage for male 
actors, for example, but depreciate with a factor of 0.14 (exp(-0.40 x 5) for female actors. 
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nominee effect for male actors, the male Oscar winner and nominee effects are not statistically different 
(∆χ2 = 1.51; p > 0.22) from each other (nor are the female Oscar winner and nominee effects statistically 
different from each other (∆χ2 = 0.83; p > 0.36)). Table 3 provides, in other words, support for 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2A for male actors but not for Hypothesis 2B because male Oscar nominees 
are not more likely to divorce than male Oscar winners. Table 3 does not, however, allow us to determine 
if the higher divorce rate of male Oscar nominees and male Oscar winners compared to male actors not 
nominated for an Oscar reflects status disruption or status deprivation. For male Oscar winners there is no 
reason to expect that their higher divorce rate reflects status deprivation, thus suggesting that their higher 
divorce rate is best explained as a consequence of status disruption, as argued in Hypothesis 1. However, 
because we cannot assume equal distance between low, medium, and high status and because Oscar 
winners always are Oscar nominees, we must examine if the Oscar winner divorce effect mostly reflects 
status disruption at Oscar nomination (moving from non-nominee to Oscar nominee) or status disruption 
unique to winning after nomination (moving from Oscar nominee to Oscar winner).   
We distinguish therefore between Oscar winners who won their first nomination and Oscar 
winners who won a later nomination to determine in which stage (non-nominee to nominee or nominee to 
winner) status disruption is most impactful. If status disruption comes mostly from the nomination, the 
increase in status between nomination and winning should be minimal and thus, we should expect that 
actors that won at first nomination (moving from non-nominee to nominee to winner almost 
simultaneously) to experience more status disruption and therefore have higher divorce rates than actors 
that win at later nomination (moving more incrementally from nominee to winner). If status disruption 
comes mostly from winning, however, the increase in status from being non-nominee to being nominee 
should be minimal and thus, we should not expect a difference in status disruption and divorce rates 
between Oscar winners who won their first nomination and those that won a later nomination. Model 13 
in Table 4 shows that, in the first year of marriage, male actors winning an Oscar in their first nomination 
(3.04; p < 0.05) and male actors winning an Oscar in a later nomination (3.07; p < 0.05) are basically 
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equally more likely to divorce than male actors not nominated for an Oscar. Winning an Oscar is, in other 
words, equally disruptive for male actors regardless of whether they win in the first nomination or in a 
later nomination. We conclude therefore that the disruption that follows winning is more impactful on 
average than the disruption that follows being nominated, which supports the observation that “[t]he 
Oscar’s effects are much more dramatic for the winners” (Levy, 2001: 282) and the status-disruption-
from-winning argument behind Hypothesis 1 for male actors. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 around here. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
For male Oscar nominees, the higher divorce rate could reflect status disruption following the 
nomination, although less likely as shown above, and status deprivation following not winning the 
nomination, as implied by Hypothesis 2A. To corroborate that status deprivation is the most likely 
theoretical mechanism behind the male Oscar nominee effect, we shift focus from being an Oscar winner 
or a nominee (as in Table 3) to distinguishing between the number of won Oscar nominations and the 
number of lost Oscar nominations. Because status deprivation is triggered by each lost nomination, 
showing that each lost Oscar nomination increases the divorce rate would indicate that the mechanism 
behind the male Oscar nominee effect is status deprivation. In is unlikely, however, that each lost 
nomination triggers status disruption because another lost nomination would not entail a significant 
change in status position. Model 15 in Table 5 shows that an additional lost nomination increases the 
male divorce rate 34 percent (1.34; p < 0.01) in the first year of marriage, whereas an additional won 
nomination does not increase the male divorce rate significantly (1.58; p > 0.10).14 Together, Table 4 and 
Table 5 provide consistent evidence for the theoretical mechanisms behind the key findings: Male Oscar 
winners, compared to non-nominees, are more likely to divorce due to status disruption, whereas male 
Oscar nominees are more likely to divorce because of status deprivation. Specifically, status deprivation 
is likely the theoretical mechanism behind Hypothesis 2A even if we found no support for Hypotheses 2B, 
                                                          
14 We also examined curvilinear specifications but found no evidence of curvilinear effects (nor did we 
find that the effect of the first lost nomination was substantively different from the effects of subsequent 
lost nominations).  
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an outcome we argued above could easily be explained by status disruption and status deprivation not 
being mutually exclusive theoretical mechanisms. Finally, the results show also that the Oscars do not 
increase the likelihood of female divorce but rather, although less stable than the male results, decrease 
their likelihood of divorce, a somewhat surprising result that awaits further research to fully explain.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 around here. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Some of the divorce control variables merit attention as well. Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 show 
that the divorce likelihood increases, the more times male and female actors have been married but that 
the negative effect is significantly stronger for females. Female actors are also more likely to divorce the 
more film appearances they have had in the last five years, whereas the number of film appearances does 
not affect the male divorce rate. The film appearance results point to an interesting dynamic for female 
actors: The Oscars increase the number of film appearances, more film appearances increase the divorce 
rate, and being divorced increases film appearances. Having actor parents increases the likelihood of 
divorce for both male and female actors, perhaps because divorce has been a common and uncontroversial 
factor during their childhood. Male actors specializing in action roles are also more likely to divorce 
whereas action specialization does not affect female divorce rate, a result that might reflect male action 
heroes being particularly attractive and stereotypical expectations of action heroes as more adventurous 
even in their personal lives. Male actors appear also to be more susceptible to marital Oscar deprivation 
than female actors. The divorce models show that male actors married to actors who are Oscar nominees 
or winners are more likely to get divorced than male actors not married to Oscar nominees or winners. 
Together, the lost-nominations and Oscar-spouse results suggest that male actors are more susceptible to 
the negative consequences of the Oscars, perhaps because males tend to be more affected by work related 
events (Conger et al., 1993; Klose and Jacobi, 2004; Matud, 2004) and deviations from traditional gender 
roles (Kessler and McRae, 1982; Menaghan, 1989). 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
            Building on sociological and social psychological research on status and happiness, we argued in 
this study that sudden positive status shifts can have negative consequences for the social actors that 
experience status shifts due to status disruption and status deprivation. Using the Oscar curse as our 
empirical case, we distinguished between negative professional (fewer film appearances) and negative 
personal (higher divorce rates) consequences of the Oscars for male and female screen actors. Our results 
provided no evidence of negative professional consequences for male or female actors: Oscar winners 
appear, on average, in more films than Oscar nominees, who, in turn, appeared in more films than non-
nominees. The professional Oscar curse is, in other words, only a Hollywood myth. The personal 
consequences of the Oscars are different. We found that the Oscars increase the divorce rate of male 
actors but, if anything, decrease the divorce rate of female actors. Exploring the increased divorce rate for 
male Oscar winners and Oscar nominees, we found that status disruption accounts best for the negative 
Oscar winner effects, whereas status deprivation accounts best for the negative Oscar nominee effects. 
Our results suggest, in other words, that the Oscars have positive professional consequences for male and 
female actors but more enduring negative personal consequences for male actors, thus emphasizing an 
important conundrum for male actors: The Oscars can help your career but also ruin your marriage.  
Our study extends status theory and empirical research in a number of different ways. First, as 
discussed briefly in the introduction, most status research focuses on the positive consequences of status 
and assumes that moving up the status hierarchy is unproblematic (e.g., Podolny, 1993; Jensen, 2003). By 
returning to the classical definition of status as a hierarchical position in a social system, by emphasizing 
that status positions embed social actors in cultural frameworks and social relations and not only function 
as a signal of quality, and by focusing on the negative consequences of positive status shifts, we broaden 
and deepen status research by arguing that status affects a wider set of outcomes than previously thought. 
Our study confirms, like most status research (e.g., Azoulay, Stuart, and Wang, 2014), that positive status 
shifts are beneficial when status mostly works as a signal of quality for third-party resource providers 
such as producers, directors, and casting directors making decisions about film roles. But our study 
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suggests also that positive status shifts can simultaneously be problematic due to status disruption and 
status deprivation when the importance of status derives less from its function as a signal of quality and 
more from the cultural and social embedding that follow occupying a particular status position, as is the 
case for the marital lives of screen actors. We argue, in other words, that our theoretical framework with 
its emphasis on status positions, status disruption, and status deprivation provides a promising 
complement to current status research by opening up for more multifaceted status research.       
Second, we draw attention to the importance of studying the long-term behavioral consequences 
of positive status shifts and not only focusing on the long-term societal consequences of tournaments 
(Frank and Cook, 1995) or their short-term psychological consequences (Medvec et al., 1995). Knowing 
that silver medalists at the Olympics appeared to be less happy than bronze medalists when they received 
their medal is important (Medvec et al., 1995) but it is also important to know the long-term behavioral 
consequences of actually moving up and barely failing to move up. To the extent that the relative 
unhappiness of silver medalists motivates them to work even harder, for example, feeling unhappy not 
being the winner may actually be beneficial for the silver medalist in the long term. By focusing on long-
term professional performance and marriage dissolution, we illustrate the importance of taking a long-
term perspective on the consequences of sudden positive status shifts and complement research on the 
immediate effects on perceived happiness with more enduring behavioral outcomes. Moreover, our split-
sample approach illustrates the importance of focusing on differences in long-term reactions among 
seemingly similar male and female tournament participants based on different hard-to-observe factors 
such as identification with tournament and perceived importance of social mobility. 
Third, we draw attention to the negative consequences for individual participants in tournaments, 
thus complementing research on societal consequences such as increased disparity between status groups 
and glorification of winner-take-all professions (Frank and Cook, 1995). The negative consequences of 
sudden positive status shifts would not matter if only Hollywood screen actors were susceptible to 
negative consequences of positive status shifts. The ubiquity of tournament structures outside prize and 
award competitions, however, ensures that sudden positive status shifts occur in numerous other settings 
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as well. Organizational outcomes ranging from lower level employee promotion and compensation 
decisions, for example, to higher-level executive appointments resemble tournaments. We suggest that it 
is important to focus more explicitly on the social actors experiencing sudden positive status shifts and 
how they react to the shifts. The positive status shift itself can bring about negative behavioral changes 
and thus, lead to negative performance outcomes. CEOs that achieve superstar status by winning awards 
for their work, for example, start devoting more time to external activities, which in turn decreases the 
performance of the firm (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Expecting to move up the status hierarchy but 
failing to actually move up has negative consequences outside the Oscars as well. Executives that fail to 
become CEOs (Cannella and Shen, 2001) or employees promoted later than their cohorts (Rosenbaum, 
1979) may be discouraged, withdraw, and suffer long-term consequences throughout their career. 
Important theoretical boundary scope conditions suggest that status disruption and status 
deprivation may not be equally important in all empirical contexts. First, status disruption and status 
deprivation are more important in discontinuous status hierarchies than continuous status hierarchies 
because clearly defined categorical status groups and boundaries likely reinforce actual and perceived 
between-group cultural and social differences and provide salient objects for counterfactual comparisons. 
Second, status disruption and status deprivation are likely more important when social actors identify 
more strongly with the status-stratified social system because the cultural and social embedding are likely 
to be more deeply rooted and because negative counterfactual comparisons are more painful. Screen 
acting is obviously an empirical setting in which the professional and personal spheres of screen actors 
are tightly intertwined, which increases the self-identification of screen actors with their profession and 
makes them more susceptible to status disruption and status deprivation. Third, status deprivation is likely 
more important when status shifts are public events that are visible to all the occupants of a status 
hierarchy and external audiences because widespread public awareness of status shifts makes it easier to 
engage in counterfactual comparisons triggering negative feelings of status deprivation.         
We realize that our study has several limitations. By focusing on the entire life histories of a large 
sample of screen actors and how the Oscars affect film appearances and divorce, it is impossible to clearly 
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specify, observe, and measure exactly how the theoretical mechanisms of status disruption and status 
deprivation account for the empirical findings. We presented theoretical arguments why positive status 
shifts may have negative consequences and discussed specifically why the Oscars may have negative 
marital consequences, drawing on rich anecdotal evidence that suggests that actors actually experience the 
negative consequences. And while our results point to the critical role of Oscar nominations in increasing 
the divorce rate of male actors, we agree that it would be useful to be able to systematically quantify the 
mechanism connecting Oscars and divorce directly. Many of the actors in our sample have already passed 
away, however, and it is not feasible to systematically interview all the living actors, a necessary step to 
fully account for the intervening processes. We believe that future research should begin exploring the 
exact nature of the theoretical mechanisms behind the negative consequences of positive status shifts. We 
are happy to have begun this important research by drawing attention to the importance of studying the 
negative consequences of tournaments and, more specifically, having dispelled the myth of the 
professional Oscar curse and identified the real personal Oscar curse: The increased likelihood of divorce 
for males following the Oscars.  
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Model 1 (Random) Model 2 (Fixed) Model 3 (Random) Model 4 (Fixed) Model 5 (Random) Model 6 (Fixed)
Oscar Winner 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.36*** 0.37***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Oscar Nominee 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Male 0.30***
(0.03)
Number of Quality Films 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Past 5-year Movie Experience 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Past 5-year Movie Experience Squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Action Specialization -0.02 -0.01 0.17* 0.17* -0.25** -0.25**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Comedy Specialization -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.05 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Age: Under 20 0.44*** 0.46*** -0.20*** -0.16** 0.64*** 0.64***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Age: 20-29 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.35*** 0.36***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age: 40-49 -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.30*** -0.31***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age: 50-59 -0.44*** -0.45*** -0.42*** -0.44*** -0.57*** -0.59***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Age: 60-69 -0.79*** -0.81*** -0.78*** -0.83*** -0.96*** -0.98***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Age: 70-79 -1.37*** -1.37*** -1.52*** -1.59*** -1.26*** -1.30***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Age: 80 and Up -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.55*** -2.61*** -1.97*** -2.02***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13)
Tenure: 5 Years or Less 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.19***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tenure: 25 to 50 Years -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.25*** -0.23***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Tenure: More Than 50 Years -0.62*** -0.66*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.82*** -0.77***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Era: Studio System (1930-1949) -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08* 0.07† 0.12**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Era: Post War (1950-1965) -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.30*** -0.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Era: New Hollywood (1966-1979) -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0.39*** -0.37***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Spouse Nominee 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Child Actor -0.50*** -0.48*** -0.45***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Actor Parents 0.06 0.09 0.09
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Divorce -0.01 -0.01 -0.05* -0.05** 0.06*** 0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.00*** 1.16*** 1.42*** 1.48*** 1.14*** 1.14***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
χ² 20316*** 19649*** 7647*** 7346*** 13444*** 13121***
Observations 30,125 29,871 13,624 13,525 16,501 16,346
Number of Actors 808 795 378 371 430 424
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
TABLE 2
Negative Binomial Regression of Number of Film Appearances in the Next Five Years (Random and Fixed Effects)
Full Male Female
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Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Oscar Winner 1.10 3.05** 0.15**
(0.10) (1.15) (0.11)
Oscar Nominee 1.11 1.96* 0.32†
(0.09) (0.63) (0.21)
Male 0.79*** 0.80***
(0.05) (0.05)
Marriage Number 1.26*** 1.25*** 1.15** 1.14* 1.35*** 1.37***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Number of Quality Films 1.10 1.08 1.04 0.98 1.12 1.17
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Past 5-year Movie Experience 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.01 1.01 1.03** 1.03**
(0.01) (0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Action Specialization 2.14** 2.17** 2.51* 2.52* 1.35 1.31
(0.62) (0.63) (1.01) (1.04) (0.62) (0.59)
Comedy Specialization 1.49* 1.52* 1.42 1.44 1.42 1.40
(0.26) (0.26) (0.37) (0.39) (0.33) (0.32)
Era: Studio System (1930-1949) 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.91
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13)
Era: Post War (1950-1965) 1.02 1.02 1.07 1.07 0.93 0.93
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
Era: New Hollywood (1966-1979) 1.27** 1.27** 1.39** 1.36* 1.15 1.15
(0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15)
Age: Under 30 1.58*** 1.61*** 1.37† 1.52* 1.63*** 1.52***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.22) (0.26) (0.19) (0.19)
Age: 40-49 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.81 0.76* 0.61*** 0.62***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Age: 50-59 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.69† 0.62* 0.39*** 0.39***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
Age: 60 and Up 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
Spouse Nominee 1.30* 1.29* 1.53* 1.49* 1.10 1.13
(0.14) (0.14) (0.27) (0.26) (0.15) (0.16)
Child Actor 1.03 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00
(0.15) (0.15) (0.24) (0.24) (0.18) (0.18)
Actor Parents 1.30* 1.30* 1.42* 1.45* 1.27† 1.30†
(0.14) (0.14) (0.24) (0.25) (0.18) (0.18)
χ² 175.79*** 178.42*** 47.57*** 57.43*** 108.06*** 121.15***
Observations 20,837 20,837 11,106 11,106 9,731 9,731
Number of Actors 705 705 333 333 372 372
Depreciation Constant (x) 0.00 0.15 0.40
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
TABLE 3
Cox Proportional Hazard Model on Divorce Rates
FemaleMaleFull
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Male Female
Model 13 Model 14
Oscar Win at First Nomination 3.04* 0.12**
(1.33) (0.09)
Oscar Win at Later Nomination 3.07* 0.61
(1.54) (0.42)
Oscar Nominee 1.96* 0.47
(0.63) (0.22)
Marriage Number 1.14* 1.35***
(0.06) (0.08)
Number of Quality Films 0.98 1.17
(0.10) (0.11)
Past 5-year Movie Experience 1.01 1.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
Action Specialization 2.52* 1.35
(1.04) (0.61)
Comedy Specialization 1.44 1.43
(0.39) (0.33)
Era: Studio System (1930-1949) 0.97 0.90
(0.15) (0.13)
Era: Post War (1950-1965) 1.07 0.92
(0.141) (0.12)
Era: New Hollywood (1966-1979) 1.36* 1.15
(0.17) (0.15)
Age: Under 30 1.52* 1.53***
(0.26) (0.19)
Age: 40-49 0.76* 0.62***
(0.11) (0.08)
Age: 50-59 0.62* 0.40***
(0.12) (0.09)
Age: 60 and Up 0.38*** 0.15***
(0.10) (0.06)
Spouse Nominee 1.49* 1.14
(0.26) (0.16)
Child Actor 0.99 0.99
(0.24) (0.18)
Actor Parents 1.45* 1.27†
(0.25) (0.18)
χ² 57.60*** 125.06***
Observations 11,106 9,731
Number of Actors 333 372
Depreciation Constant (x) 0.15 0.30
Robust standard errors in parentheses
TABLE 4
Cox Proportional Hazard Model on Divorce Rates 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
(First vs. Later Nomination Wins)
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Male Female
Model 15 Model 16
Lost Nominations (#) 1.34** 0.76
(0.14) (0.24)
Won Nominations (#) 1.58 0.31†
(0.60) (0.19)
Marriage Number 1.14* 1.38***
(0.06) (0.07)
Number of Quality Films 1.00 1.16
(0.10) (0.11)
Past 5-year Movie Experience 1.01 1.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
Action Specialization 2.58* 1.28
(1.06) (0.59)
Comedy Specialization 1.45 1.39
(0.39) (0.32)
Era: Studio System (1930-1949) 0.97 0.92
(0.15) (0.13)
Era: Post War (1950-1965) 1.07 0.93
(0.14) (0.12)
Era: New Hollywood (1966-1979) 1.37* 1.15
(0.17) (0.15)
Age: Under 30 1.46* 1.56***
(0.24) (0.19)
Age: 40-49 0.78† 0.62***
(0.11) (0.08)
Age: 50-59 0.64* 0.39***
(0.13) (0.09)
Age: 60 and Up 0.40*** 0.15***
(0.10) (0.06)
Spouse Nominee 1.50* 1.13
(0.26) (0.15)
Child Actor 0.98 1.01
(0.23) (0.18)
Actor Parents 1.42* 1.31*
(0.24) (0.18)
χ² 67.66*** 117.65***
Observations 11,106 9,731
Number of Actors 333 372
Depreciation Constant (x) 0.20 0.40
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10
TABLE 5
Cox Proportional Hazard Model on Divorce Rates (Lost Nominations)
